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A large body of research investigates the diffusion of policies and political 
developments across countries, and analyzes its consequences for mass preference 
formation and electoral accountability. While we know that voters look at policy 
outcomes abroad to assess domestic performance, the politics through which policies 
emerge can also be informative to voters. To understand whether voters learn from 
observing other countries’ domestic political struggles, we analyze the international 
reverberations of British Brexit politics. We argue that, although it may be too soon 
to assess the actual consequences of Brexit for the UK, political struggles during the 
negotiations may have provided information about the political feasibility and 
desirability of leaving the EU. We analyze three key events in recent British politics 
that happened during the fieldwork of two surveys, and a natural experiment that 
leverages random variation in exposure to Brexit-related information. Results confirm 
both a deterrence and an encouragement effect of Brexit on support for leaving the 
EU in remaining member states, and provide causal evidence of the benchmarking 
mechanism. These findings show how news coverage of other countries’ domestic 
politics can simplify voters’ decision-making by reducing the uncertainty associated 
with alternative policy choices. They have implications for theories of EU support 
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Do voters learn from observing other countries’ politics and adapt their preferences 
and political behavior in line with this information? Answering this question is 
important, because it allows us to better understand the diffusion of ideas and political 
developments across countries. Against the backdrop of an emerging wave of 
globalization backlash, support for populist parties, and challenges to democracy 
across Western democracies, understanding whether and how developments in one 
country are perceived and evaluated by the mass public abroad could allow us to not 
only better distinguish domestic and international sources of these current political 
changes, but also to better understand the systemic dynamics of these changes. 
 
Existing research suggests that major events in one country can affect mass public 
opinion abroad. Terrorist events in one country have been shown to negatively affect 
public opinion on migration in other countries (Böhmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). 
Major “iconic events,” such as the 1917 Russian revolution or the successful protests 
in Tunisia and Egypt that marked the beginning of the Arab spring have been shown 
to increase political contention in other countries (Weyland 2010; Hale 2013; Bamert, 
Gilardi, and Wasserfallen 2015) and had systemic effects by creating waves of 
democratization (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010; Weyland 2009). Likewise, highly 
reported political events with major foreign policy consequences, such as the 2005 
rejection of the EU Constitution in France (Malet 2019; Schraff 2020), the 2016 
election of Donald Trump as US president (Minkus, Deutschmann, and Delhey 2018), 
or the spring 2019 Brexit chaos that nearly pushed the UK and the EU into a No-
Deal Brexit (Walter 2021), have been shown to reverberate among the mass public 
abroad. 
 
Politics is usually more boring, however. Most political decisions are taken after long 
and sometimes tedious discussions, and their implications take time to materialize. 
While the domestic political struggles may seem big for ardent observers, in 
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comparison to the major events discussed above, they look more like politics as usual. 
In fact, most important and far-reaching decisions are taken in this less eventful mode. 
This raises the question whether and to what extent such more normal domestic 
politics struggles reverberate abroad. 
 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the systemic reverberations of this 
more regular type of domestic politics abroad. It argues that domestic political 
struggles abroad can provide information to voters in other countries about the 
political feasibility and desirability of certain policy proposals. News coverage of other 
countries’ domestic politics can thus simplify voters’ decision-making by reducing the 
uncertainty associated with alternative policy choices. As a result, cross-border 
information may shape domestic evaluations and preferences of these policy proposals.  
We examine this argument for the case of Brexit. Given that many euroskeptic 
politicians across other EU countries have also proposed that their country leave the 
EU, we argue that British Brexit politics, that is the domestic political struggles 
surrounding the United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal from the European Union (EU), 
provided important pieces of information for the mass publics in other EU countries 
about the feasibility and desirability of such a policy proposal. To examine the causal 
effect of information about British Brexit politics on support for European integration 
in other EU countries, we present two sets of analyses that exploits the co-occurrence 
of key events in the Brexit negotiations and the fieldwork of two surveys to causally 
identify how information about the domestic politics of Brexit affected individuals’ 
EU-related opinion.  
 
Our analysis of two key events in recent British politics that happened during the 
fieldwork of the European Social Survey shows that information about the political 
difficulties surrounding Brexit in British politics made voters in other EU countries 
view the EU more positively. In addition to this deterrence effect, we also find 
encouragement effects of Brexit on support for leaving the EU in remaining member 
states in instances when domestic Brexit politics seems to be going well. A natural 
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experiment that leverages exogenous variation in news coverage additionally provides 
evidence on the causal mechanism. In line with research on international diffusion via 
elites (e.g., Gilardi 2010), we find that information about the politics surrounding 
certain policy proposals influence how voters abroad assess the merits of these policies, 
and this in turn affects their policy preferences for similar policy proposals in their 
own countries.  
 
 
The effect of information from abroad on domestic policy 
preferences 
 
Given the generally low level of political knowledge about national politics, let alone 
international affairs (Clark and Hellwig 2012; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gilens 2001), 
it may seem unlikely that voters directly respond to these less salient political 
developments in other countries. Yet, existing research suggests that voters do look 
abroad in order to benchmark domestic policy successes and failures. Studies of 
economic voting show that voters compare the performance of their national economy 
with the world economy, thus effectively using the performance of other countries as 
benchmark (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Kayser and Peress 2012; Aytaç 2017). 
Likewise, voters have been shown to compare their own country relative to others on 
indicators such as their own country’s economic performance relative to others (e.g., 
Gärtner 1997; Hobolt and Leblond 2009; 2013), or their satisfaction with their 
national own political system relative to their assessment of other systems 
(Rohrschneider 2002; e.g., Anderson 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Ecker-Ehrhardt 




1 Voters also respond to elite cues (e.g., Steenbergen, Edwards, and De Vries 2007; De Vries 
and Edwards 2009; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020), but we focus here on the direct effect of 
information on voters’ attitudes and behavior. 
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 There is also considerable evidence that voters compare the status quo of EU 
membership to imagined counterfactual scenario of exit (De Vries 2018), and that 
other countries’ experiences with exit can provide powerful information that allows 
voters to update their priors about this imagined counterfactual (De Vries 2017; 
Walter 2020; 2021).  This confirms previous evidence in the economics literature that 
people evaluate the performance of their local government by comparing policy 
outcomes with those of other jurisdictions (Besley and Case 1995). 
 
Although much of this research has focused on policy outcomes as a basis of 
comparison (Kayser and Peress 2012; Linos 2011; C. De Vries 2018; Hobolt and 
Leblond 2009), observing the politics through which these policies emerge is likely to 
be informative to voters, too. After all, these political struggles convey important 
information about the political pitfalls, difficulties, and opportunities associated with 
pursuing a certain policy proposal (Saideman 2012; Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2019; 
Gilardi 2010). We therefore argue that observing another countries’ political struggles 
is equally relevant for voters as observing policy outcomes.    
 
To make meaningful comparisons with the experiences of foreign countries, citizens 
thus must acquire relevant information and update their prior beliefs in light of the 
information they receive. However, when scholars have tested to what extent citizens 
directly make these comparisons and use information about foreign countries to 
update, the findings have been more mixed. Kayser and Peress (2020) find that voters 
do not keep track of global economic trends, and that rather, the media pre-
benchmark their economic news reporting by attributing positive and negative 
evaluations to a country’s economic performance in relation to the world economy. 
More generally, media reporting is biased and voters only benchmark policies in 
countries covered by the media (Linos 2011). Likewise, several studies suggest that 
Western broadcasts sapped support for communist regimes by enabling Eastern 
European to compare their living standards as well as their liberties to those of 
Western citizens (Diamond 1993; Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider 1996; Whitehead 2001). 
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Yet, a careful study of the effect of West German television in the DDR (Kern and 
Hainmueller 2009) suggests that foreign media may have accidentally stabilized 
authoritarian regimes by offering people a source of entertainment. Similarly, Huang 
and Yeh (2016) show that, after accounting for people’ selective exposure to foreign 
media outlets, Chinese citizens that read positive news about foreign countries have 
more positive evaluations of their domestic regime. 
 
 
How information about foreign political processes helps voters 
benchmark policy outcomes 
 
Previous research suggests that it is important to disentangle the effects of 
information obtained by observing policies and politics abroad, and other factors that 
may drive or interact with this information effect. However, understanding whether 
and to which extent voters process information about and learn from the political 
experiences of other countries is difficult because studies of information effects on 
public opinion are plagued by endogeneity. Individuals tend to expose themselves to 
political messages they agree with (Bartels 1993; Stroud 2008), to interpret new 
information in light of their previous beliefs and identities (Taber and Lodge 2006; 
Walter 2021; Grynberg, Walter, and Wasserfallen 2019), and to respond to elite cues 
(Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020; Guisinger 
and Saunders 2017). This may obscure the effect of information and can generate the 
impression that benchmarking does not take place.  
 
To disentangle the informational effect of observing foreign policies and politics, we 
analyze the impact that political events have on the policy preferences of citizens 
abroad. We argue that foreign political events can act as information shocks and 
produce a change in attitudes. First of all, political events have the potential to break 
into the news of other countries, as the “game of politics” is more newsworthy than 
performance indicators. In a commercialised media system, journalistic practices such 
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as horse-race reporting, personalisation, and infotainment, tend to highlight the 
political contest at the expense of the substantive content of policies (Esser 2013). 
Given the limited space that national newspapers can devote to media coverage of 
foreign countries, citizens are more likely to be aware of foreign political processes 
rather than policy outcomes. 
 
Yet, how does observing foreign political events affect citizens’ policy attitudes? The 
literature on policy diffusion among political elites highlights three potential 
mechanisms that may be relevant also for voters: competition, emulation, and 
learning (Braun et al. 2008; Gilardi 2012; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). First, 
foreign political events may affect policy preferences abroad when countries compete 
for resources or in the international arena. For example, the 2016 election of Donald 
Trump as US president increased support for European integration because its 
nationalist discourse sparked a rally-round-the flag effect among Europeans  (Minkus, 
Deutschmann, and Delhey 2018). Second, citizen can change their preferences when 
they observe foreign political events that signal the perceived appropriateness of 
certain policies. A previous study documents that the 2016 US election increased 
racist attitudes in Europe as Donald Trump’s win signaled a shift in social norms 
(Giani and Méon 2019). Finally, people can learn from foreign political successes and 
failures. Previous studies have shown that major “iconic events” such as the 1917 
Russian revolution or the successful protests in Tunisia and Egypt that marked the 
beginning of the Arab spring increased political contention abroad (Weyland 2010; 
Hale 2013; Bamert, Gilardi, and Wasserfallen 2015), not just because of a process of 
emulation, but because citizens learned from other countries’ experiences about the 
feasibility and the likely consequences of a revolt against their regime. 
 
In this study, we argue that political events that are certainly less consequential than 
a revolution can nonetheless signal the success and failure of policy choices and 
provide information about the political pitfalls and opportunities associated with 
policy proposals. Learning about the processes that surround the definition and 
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formulation of a policy can affect peoples’ assessments of the feasibility of a policy 
and their expectations about the desirability of its outcome. Policy-making processes 
that are marked by high levels of disagreements, long and tedious discussions, and 
repeated failures, may signal that policy outcomes could be unfavorable too. 
Conversely, when policies enjoy a large consensus and a smooth approval, political 
processes may signal that the actual consequences of the policy may be equally 
positive. Against this backdrop, we argue that by observing domestic political 
struggles in other countries voters update their assessments of the expected outcome 
of the policy in that country. In turn, they use these expectations as a benchmark to 





We examine the causal effect of information about other country’s domestic political 
struggles on voters’ attitudes, by focusing on the UK’s domestic political struggles 
during the Brexit process, that is the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. After the Brexit 
vote, British politics entered a new phase of intense political debates over both the 
concrete implementation of the referendum and the negotiating strategy with the EU. 
While the actual consequences of leaving the EU take time to materialize, the political 
debates fueled by the Brexit negotiations represented a clear source of information 
for citizens of remaining member states. Coverage of these political struggles produced 
a sort of EU-wide informational campaign about the consequences of leaving the EU. 
 
To study the causal effect of Brexit-related information on EU citizens’ attitudes we 
present two sets of analyses. Both exploit the co-occurrence of certain key domestic 
political events in the Brexit negotiations and the fieldwork of public opinion surveys 
in certain EU-27 countries. These analyses allow us to estimate how information about 
the development of the Brexit negotiations affected support for the EU and EU exit 
in the remaining member states. Our analyses cover a time window between December 
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2018 and December 2019, when the Brexit issue became a salient topic in remaining 
EU countries in light of the struggles of the British government led by Theresa May 
to find parliamentary support for the Withdrawal Agreement, and later with the 
election of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister. 
 
Figure 1 shows the salience of Brexit in four German newspapers – Bild, Die Welt, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Handelsblatt –, as well as the sentiment of the reporting. 
The green area shows the weekly number of articles that mention the word “Brexit”, 
our indicator for the salience of the issue. After a high peak in the week of the 
referendum vote, reporting of Brexit followed an average of around 30 articles per 
week during the first phase of the negotiations. However, the number of articles 
devoted of started to increase at the end of 2018 in coincidence as complications 
started to emerge over the parliamentary approval of the first deal on the divorce 
settlement. Two peaks in the graph correspond to the fight within the Tory party 
that led to the first challenge to Theresa May’s leadership and the first parliamentary 
rejection of the Withdrawal Agreement. Another peak occurs in the week of the 
national elections that sanctioned the success of Boris Johnson in December 2019. 
 
Interestingly, the three events we analyze are marked by a distinctive polarity of the 
words used in the reporting. The sentiment analysis we performed on a subset of titles 
and leads containing the word “Brexit” shows that, while the struggles of May’s 
government were reported with clear negative words, Johnson’s electoral success was 
positively reported. We thus expect the two events that sanctioned the difficulties of 
the May’s government to increased support for European integration in remaining 
member states. Conversely, our hypothesis is that Johnson’s win had a negative 










Analysis 1: Brexit-struggles during May’s government 
 
In a first analysis, we examine the effect of two Brexit-related episodes on support for 
the EU in several EU-27 countries. These episodes were domestic political events and 
did not have an immediate effect on EU-UK relations or the Brexit negotiations, but 
were covered intensely in the European media. Importantly, they highlighted the 
difficulties associated with Brexit. The first event occurred when the British PM, 
Theresa May, survived a no confidence vote in her leadership of the Tory Party, but 
was forced to promise to step down before the next election (December 13, 2008). 
Three days earlier, May had postponed the first vote in the House of Commons on 
the Brexit withdrawal agreement negotiated by her government, because she was 
faced with the prospect of a defeat after massive opposition within her own party. 
The second episode happened one month later, on January 15, 2019, when the House 
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of Commons indeed rejected the Withdrawal Agreement with 432 votes against the 
deal and only 202 in favor (the largest defeat for a government motion in UK’s history 
since the introduction of the universal suffrage). The same day, May survived another 
vote of no confidence in her party leadership. As shown in Figure 1, the two events 
we study increased the salience of the Brexit debate in other European countries.  
 
We exploit the fact that these events happened during the fieldwork of the European 
Social Survey (ESS). Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-random nature of 
the political events mentioned above relative to the timing of interviews in the ESS. 
Hence, our identifying assumption is that the Brexit negotiations did not interfere 
with the implementation of the survey (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández 2020). 
The first postponement of the vote on the Brexit Deal and the challenge to May’s 
party leadership occurred during the survey fieldwork of fifteen EU member states, 
while the analysis of the first parliamentary rejection in January 2019 is restricted to 
fourteen countries.2 
 
Following previous studies (Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, and Campante 2020; Giani 
and Méon 2019; Mikulaschek, Pant, and Tesfaye 2020), we base our main analysis on 
an interval of ±15 days before and after each of the two episodes: the 13 December 
2018 challenge to May’s leadership, and the 15 January 2019 rejection of the 
Agreement. This bandwidth mitigates the risk that other events confound the 
estimation of the impact of Brexit events on public attitudes. At the same time, it 
allows us to retain a large enough number of observations, given that the ESS is based 
on face-to-face interviews that require long fieldworks. Figures A1 and A2 in the SI 
show a balance test for several respondent characteristics that may potentially 
correlate with the timing of the interview and the outcomes of interest, such as gender, 
education, age, unemployment status in the previous 12 months, the type of 
 
2 The December event occurred during the fieldwork of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Rep., 
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Sweden, and Slovenia. The January event covers also the fieldwork of counties mentioned 
above plus Italy, but without Austria and Denmark. 
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community where the respondent lives, and whether he or she voted in the previous 
national elections. Although differences between the sample of respondents 
interviewed before and after the two events are relatively small, we use a popular 
matching technique, entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012), to adjust inequalities in 
the distributions of the pre-treatment covariates mentioned above. 
 
As the domestic political events discussed above are inherently linked to the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU, our outcome of interest is respondents’ support for European 
integration. We use two items which are part of the ESS questionnaire. The first 
question asks: “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European 
unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, 
what number on the scale best describes your position?”. The card displays an 11-
point scale from 0 (“Unification already gone too far”) to 10 (“Unification go further”). 
The second question asks respondents about their support for their country’s EU 
membership: “Imagine there were a referendum in [your country] tomorrow about 
membership of the European Union. Would you vote for [your country] to remain a 
member of the European Union or to leave the European Union?”. Possible answers 
beyond “leave” and “remain” include “submit a blank ballot,” “spoil the ballot paper,” 
“would not vote,” and “don’t know”. We regroup all these answers into one category 
and analyze this question with a multinomial logit model where the absence of a clear 




We analyze the impact of two episodes in which the chaotic status of British politics 
during the Brexit negotiation became particularly apparent on respondents’ support 
for the EU. For this purpose, we compare respondents interviewed in the two weeks 
after the event with respondents interviewed in the two weeks before the event.  
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Results in Table 1 show that the Brexit-related domestic troubles of the British 
governments reverberated in other EU member states and affected respondents' 
attitudes about the EU. Both episodes under study have a small but statistically 
significant effect on peoples’ support for European integration. People interviewed in 
the aftermath of the confidence vote on May’s leadership were 2-3 percent more likely 
to think that European integration should be pushed further. We detect a similar 
effect for people interviewed after the first rejection of May’s Withdrawal Agreement 




Table 1 – The effect of Brexit-related domestic political struggles in the 
UK on support for European integration in other EU countries 
  
 DV: Support for European integration (0-10) 
  
 
Challenge to May’s  
leadership 
First rejection of the  
Withdrawal Agreement  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Treatment 0.255*** 0.289*** 0.168** 0.199** 
 (0.090) (0.106) (0.083) (0.094) 
          
Constant 4.087*** 4.098*** 5.541*** 5.603*** 
 (0.114) (0.154) (0.174) (0.171) 
      
Observations 4,005 3,974 4,345 4,268 
Country FE ü ü ü ü 
Entropy balancing  ü  ü 
Log Likelihood -9,584.47 -9,815.70 -10,358.86 -10,504.26 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 19,200.94 19,663.40 20,747.72 21,038.53 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Design weights apply. Entropy balancing adjusts the distribution of the pre-/post-event samples 
by age, age squared, gender, education, type of community, unemployment status, and turnout in 





Table 2 – The effect of Brexit-related domestic political struggles in the UK 
on support for EU membership in other EU countries 
 
 Dependent variable: Support for EU membership (3 categories) 
 
Challenge to May’s  
leadership 
First rejection of the  
Withdrawal Agreement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Leave Remain Leave Remain Leave Remain Leave Remain 
Treatment 0.229 0.314** 0.303 0.396** -0.030 0.088 -0.030 0.088 
 (0.160) (0.131) (0.192) (0.156) (0.126) (0.099) (0.126) (0.099) 
Constant 0.445** 1.942*** 0.417* 1.880*** 1.168** 3.484*** 1.168** 3.484*** 
 (0.179) (0.150) (0.220) (0.180) (0.472) (0.418) (0.472) (0.418) 
Observations 3665 3629 4425 4342 
Country FE ü ü ü ü 
Entropy balance   ü   ü 
AIC 5,069.488   6,505.431  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Multinomial logit models (reference category: spoilt 
vote/abstain/don’t know). Design weights apply. Entropy balancing adjusts the distribution of the pre-
/post-event samples by age, age squared, gender, education, type of community, unemployment status, 
and turnout in the previous election. 
 
 
Table 2 present the analysis of people’s vote intentions in a hypothetical referendum 
on their country’s EU membership. The results are interesting for two reasons. First, 
they show that the increase in support for European integration translated into a 
change in vote intentions in the case of the challenge to May’s leadership (models 1-
2), but not in the case of the rejection of the Framework Agreement (models 3-4). 
The absence of a significant effect of the second event may suggest that, as people 
update their preferences in a cumulative way, successive events may have a weaker 
informative value than similar previous events. Second, models 1 and 2 give us some 
indications of the type of attitude change that foreign political events generate. 
Indeed, the increase in the probability to vote in favor of remaining EU member does 
not come at the expenses of the probability of voting “leave.” Instead, after the event, 
it is the probability to abstain, spoil the ballot, or answering “don’t know” that 
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decreases. In the absence of panel data that would allow a more sound inference about 
the previous attitudes of those who learned from British Brexit politics, these results 
suggest that negative events increased support for European integration among people 
without strong preferences, rather than persuading euroskeptic voters. 
 
Our analysis rests on the assumption that the timing of the survey interview does not 
affect the outcome through any other channel except for the event of interest 
(excludability). In the SI we present some falsification tests to corroborate this 
assumption. First, we exclude that the effect we detect is due to the mere increase in 
salience of EU issues by analyzing the effect of another Brexit-related event without 
negative connotations and with clear foreign policy implications, the agreement 
between the British government and EU leaders on November 15, 2018. This event 
had no significant effect on European voters’ support for EU integration (see table 
A1).  Second, we show that the events we study have no effect on other placebo 
outcomes such as satisfaction with the economy, left-right placement, immigration 
attitudes (table A2). These results lend support to our identification strategy as they 
show that the timing of the survey interview does not affect the outcome through 
other channels such as simultaneous events or unrelated time trends. 
 
Analysis 2: Johnson’s electoral success 
 
In a second analysis, we study the effect of the electoral victory of the Conservative 
Party in December 2019. As the 2017 election had resulted in a minority government, 
after the replacement of Theresa May, the new PM Boris Johnson called a snap 
election to increase the parliamentary support for his Brexit strategy. The campaign 
mainly centered around the new withdrawal agreement he had negotiated with the 
EU, and for which he was now asking the British electorate a parliamentary majority. 
 
We leverage the fact that the election results came out during the fieldwork of the 
Eurobarometer survey 92.4. The British elections took place on December 12, exactly 
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in the middle of the fieldwork that lasted from December 6 to December 19. The 
analysis of the Eurobarometer thus covers all 27 EU member states. 
 
Although the EB 92.4 was devoted to investigate people’ environmental concerns, the 
questionnaire also asked a couple of questions about the EU. The first question asks 
respondents to rank their perception of the EU from 1 (a very negative image) to 5 
(a very positive image). The second question asks: “At the present time, would you 
say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, 
in the European Union?”.3 This question follows an identically worded question that 
asks about how things are going at the national level. We can thus compare answers 
to these two questions.  
 
 
Table 3 – The effect of Johnson’s victory on people’s perceived EU image 
and evaluations of the EU’s current direction 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 Image of the EU  
(1-5) 
EU in the right 
direction (0-1) 
Own country in the 
right direction (0-1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment 0.016 0.009 -0.013* -0.018** 0.001 -0.0001 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 3.281*** 3.270*** 0.385*** 0.378*** 0.525*** 0.517*** 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) 
Observations 26,085 25,204 22,948 22,303 24,428 23,667 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Entropy balancing  ü  ü  ü 
AIC 67,303.80 66,877.35 32,939.20 34,473.71 34,047.76 35,357.19 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Entropy balancing adjusts the distribution of the pre-/post-
event samples by age, age squared, gender, education, type of community, social status, and 
profession. 
 
3 Spontaneous answers that said “neither of the two” were also coded. In a robustness test, 
these are treated as middle option and modelled in an ordinal logistic regression (see Table 
B1 in the appendix).  
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There is no effect of Johnson’s victory on people’s perceived image of the EU. 
However, people were two percent less likely to say that things were going in the right 
direction in the EU after the British elections. No effect is found on people’s rating of 
the current direction of their own country. 
 
Models 3 and 4 are replicated using a shorter time window in Table B1 the appendix 
(+/- 3 days from the elections). The effects are slightly stronger and achieve higher 
statistical significance. This further corroborates our research design. Treated and 
control group show no significant difference on a common placebo outcome such as 
left-right self-positioning. 
 
Analysis 3: Testing the benchmarking mechanism 
 
In a third analysis, we investigate the role of the media in conveying information 
about foreign domestic politics in more detail, and its effect on people’s ability to use 
this information as a benchmark for their EU support. For this purpose, we exploit 
the fact that we had a public opinion survey in the field just after Theresa May’s 
decision to postpone the vote on the Withdrawal Agreement and her promise to step 
down before the following elections on 13 December 2018. The survey was part of a 
tracking survey by which we surveyed respondents in all EU-27 countries on Brexit- 
and EU-related issues in six-month intervals throughout the Brexit withdrawal 
negotiations (July 2017- December 2019, for details, see Walter 2021). The December 
2018 wave was fielded between December 14 and December 21, 2018. 
 
We leverage that the first postponement of the parliamentary vote on the Withdrawal 
agreement and the confidence vote on Theresa Mays’ party leadership (December 10 
and 13, 2018) happened at the same time of the final round of the group stage of the 
main Europe-wide football championships (December 11-13, 2018). We assume that 
in regions where the local team played a match of either the Champions League or 
the Europa League, soccer coverage dominated the news, giving less space to coverage 
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of other countries’ political struggles. This allows us to explore the quasi-random 
variation in news coverage of Brexit difficulties in the European media and its effect 
on support for EU exit. Following Eisensee and Strömberg (2007), who show that 
countries that experience a natural disaster during the Olympic games receive less 
attention and thus less financial support, we argue that respondents with local soccer 
teams in the championships have received less information about Brexit. We focus on 
Germany where support for football teams has a clear regional pattern. 
 
We construct a binary treatment indicator, called Higher Exposure (no game), that 
measures whether (one of) the region’s local football teams played in the Champions 
League or Europa League’s group stage. This variable takes the value of 0 if the local 
team played in a match, meaning that media coverage was pre-occupied with soccer-
related news, and 1 if the local did not play, leaving more space for coverage of the 
UK’s internal Brexit struggles.  
 
Two outcomes are of interest. First, we analyze respondents’ evaluation of the effect 
of Brexit on the UK. The question asks: “Five years from now on, do you think Brexit 
will make the UK much better off, somewhat better off, neither better nor worse off, 
somewhat worse off, or much worse off?”. Responses are marked on a five-point scale 
ranging from (1) much worse off to (5) much better off. Second, we analyze 
respondents’ support for their own country’s exit from the EU. The question asks: “If 
Germany were to hold a referendum on leaving the EU today, how would you vote?”. 
Respondents could choose four options from (1) “I would definitely vote to remain the 
EU” to (4) “I would definitely vote to leave the EU”.  
 
We use the participation of the local team to one of the two football competition as 
a random source of regional variation in exposure to Brexit-related information and 
investigate the effect of exposure to Brexit-related news in a difference-in-differences 
setting by comparing respondents answers in the December 2018 and July 2018 survey 
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waves.4 We include wave and region fixed effects and a number of pre-treatment 
covariates (gender, age, age squared, education, and whether the respondent lives in 
an urban or rural community). We estimate OLS models both with and without 
covariates. 
 
We expect evaluations of Brexit to become more negative between July and December 
for all respondents, but especially for those in regions where the local team did not 
play a football match as these respondents were more exposed to negative information 
about Brexit. Accordingly, we also expect people in these regions to become less 




Results in Table 4 show that in regions that were more exposed to new information 
because their local soccer team was not playing in the final round of the European 
championships, voters updated their attitudes three times more compared to people 
in regions where the local team played in the round of European football leagues. The 
higher exposure brought voters to evaluate the effects of Brexit on the UK more 
negatively, and to become less supportive of a German exit from the EU. The effect 
size is substantial. The decline in Brexit evaluations is equal to -0.14 for less exposed 
respondents, and -0.34 for more exposed respondents. This means that people that 
received more information were 9 percent more likely to have negative evaluations of 
the effect of Brexit on the UK compared to people interview six months earlier in the 
same regions, while the effect for respondents which were less exposed to new 
information is reduced to a 3-percentage point change. These results confirm that the 
British struggles over Brexit provided new information to people in other European 
countries about the political consequences of leaving the EU. Those who were more 
exposed to this information were more likely to update their evaluations of Brexit 
and their support for leaving the EU. 
 
4 The third wave was fielded between June 22 and July 2, 2018.  
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To probe the plausibility of our identification assumption, Figure 2 shows the trends 
in Brexit evaluations and support for EU exit from July 2017 and December 2019 for 
German regions where the local team played a European football match in December 
2018 and for regions where no football team participated. Before the December 2018 
wave, there is no significant difference in Brexit evaluations and in support for EU 
exit between the two groups of regions identified by the participation of their football 
team to the round of European championship. Interestingly, there is also no significant 
difference between the two groups in the following waves. The effect that we identify 
is necessarily short-lived as people that were less exposed to the new information in 
December are likely to have received additional information from following Brexit-
related events (including the 15 January rejection of the Brexit deal analyzed above), 
either directly as we have shown in our case study, or mediated by the discourse of 
German political elites. 
 
Table 4 – Difference-in-differences models: Germany 
  
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Positive evaluation of  
post-Brexit UK (1-5) 
Support for EU  
exit (1-4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Higher exposure  -0.240** -0.208** -0.186* -0.205** 
(no game) (0.106) (0.105) (0.100) (0.099) 
     
December wave -0.117* -0.136** -0.118* -0.094 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.061) (0.062) 
Constant 2.503*** 2.929*** 1.621*** 1.361*** 
 (0.258) (0.305) (0.253) (0.341) 
               
 
Observations 3,016 2,960 3,002 2,950 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.044 0.017 0.053 
Region FE ü  ü  ü  ü  
Demographic controls    ü       ü  
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Post-
stratification weights apply. Demographic controls include age, age squared, gender, 
education, rural/urban community.  
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To further check whether public opinion in regions with and without a football team 
in one of the two European championships followed similar trends prior to the event, 
we conduct a falsification test and estimate a placebo difference-in-differences 
regression with a similar specification for the previous waves of our survey (see Table 
C1 in the SI). We also estimate the same models presented in Table 4 with two 
placebo outcomes such as respondents’ satisfaction with the position of the German 
government in the Brexit negotiations, and their evaluations of Brexit effects on 
Germany (Table C2 in the SI). The absence of significant treatment effects on these 
two placebo outcomes lend support to our identification strategy, by excluding the 
possibility the other unrelated events affected our outcome of interest. 
 
 
We next explore the causal mechanism in a mediation analysis. The identification of 
a causal mechanism requires the specification of an intermediate variable that lies on 
the causal pathway between the treatment and the outcome variable. In our case, we 
test whether and to what extent the change in Brexit evaluations mediate the decline 
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results in Table 5 confirm that a higher exposure to Brexit information has no 
significant direct effect on support for EU exit, while the average causal mediation 
effect is equal to -0.037. The decline in Brexit evaluations account for 53 percent of 




Table 5 – Mediation analysis 
 
 Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value 
ACME             -0.112     -0.213 0.00 0.044** 
ADE              -0.098  -0.265 0.07 0.258  
Total effect -0.210     -0.405 0.00 0.051* 
Prop. mediated 0.533 -0.297 2.00 0.078* 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05. Nonparametric Bootstrap Confidence Intervals based on 10’000 




Figure 3 – Direct and indirect effects 
 











This paper has analyzed the causal effect of information about the struggles of the 
British government during the Brexit negotiations on EU-related preferences of voters 
in remaining EU member countries. The results show that two events that signaled 
the demise of the Brexit aspirations – the challenge to Theresa May’s leadership 
within the Conservative Party, and the first parliamentary rejection of the Brexit 
Deal – increased public support for European integration abroad, while a positive 
event – Johnson’s electoral success – made people’s evaluations of the current 
direction of the EU more negative. Even in the absence of observable policy outcomes 
that could inform citizens in remaining member states about the actual effects of 
leaving the EU, people learned from domestic events of British politics about the 
political consequences of Brexit. Based on a diff-in-diff design that exploits random 
variation in exposure to information among German voters, we have provided causal 
evidence of the existence of this specific type of cross-national learning. We further 
tested the benchmarking mechanism via a mediation analysis. When the difficulty of 
the British government became evident abroad, German voters started to have more 
negative views of the consequences of Brexit for the UK, and in turn this brought 
them to update their preferences for a German exit. Not only do these findings confirm 
previous arguments about a deterrence effect of negative Brexit events (de Vries 2017, 
Walter 2020, Walter 2021), they also highlight a potential encouragement effect of 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, thus contributing to our understanding of the 
systemic reverberations of the backlash against international institutions.  
 
At the same time, the fact that voters are able to gather information about the 
domestic politics of foreign countries and to apply it in their own political evaluations 
has important normative implications. On the one hand, cross-country comparisons 
may provide a corrective for people’s strong status quo bias (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979) by reducing the uncertainty associated with alternative policy choices. On the 
other hand, the possibility to learn from other countries’ successes and failures could 
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help voters to hold politicians accountable for policy pledges and outcomes. Foreign 
countries’ policy failures could warn voters against ill-conceived policies, while the 
success of a policy in another country could enable voters to distinguish potential 
flaws in their own country’s policy design. This suggests that a higher coverage of 
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Figure A2 – Balance plot (January window) 
 
 






































































Covariate balance - January window
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Table A1 – Falsification test ESS: placebo date 
  
 Support for EU integration (1-10) 
 (1) (2) 
Placebo 0.077 0.094 
(post 15.11.18) (0.073) (0.080) 
Constant 4.506*** 4.533*** 
 (0.111) (0.143) 
Observations 5,140 5,077 
Country FE ü ü 
Entropy balancing  ü 
Log Likelihood -12,215.730 -12,166.290 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 24,459.450 24,360.590 




Table A2 – Falsification test ESS: placebo outcomes 
  
 Dependent variable: 
 Economic satisfaction Left-right Immigration (culture) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment 1 0.022  -0.007  0.086  
(post 13.12.18) (0.078)  (0.090)  (0.101)  
Treatment 2  0.089  -0.053  0.106 
(post 15.01.19)  (0.073)  (0.081)  (0.087) 
Constant 6.894*** 5.382*** 4.746*** 4.818*** 5.030*** 6.065*** 
 (0.087) (0.112) (0.103) (0.143) (0.134) (0.141) 
Observations 4,100 4,450 3,784 3,947 4,068 4,442 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Entropy balancing ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Log Likelihood -8,993.428 -9,890.425 -8,506.759 -8,927.307 -9,806.792 -10,748.040 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 18,018.860 19,810.850 17,045.520 17,884.610 19,645.580 21,526.090 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Covariate balance - Eurobarometer December 2019
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Table B1 – Robustness tests for study 2: Johnson’s election victory 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 
EU in the right 
direction (0-1)  
± 3 days 
EU in the right 
direction (1-3) – 
Ordered logit 
Placebo outcome: 
left right (1-10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment -0.024*** -0.024** -0.046* -0.050** -0.037 -0.016 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.027) (0.020) (0.030) (0.035) 
Constant 0.372*** 0.368***   5.015*** 4.980*** 
 (0.019) (0.021)   (0.069) (0.080) 
Intercept 1|2   -0.232*** -0.215***   
   (0.061) (0.045)   
Intercept 2|3   0.353*** 0.370***   
   (0.061) (0.045)   
Observations 14,158 13,737 22,948 22,303 21,702 21,222 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Entropy balancing  ü  ü  ü 
AIC 20,194.85 21,513.50 44,029.87 77,379.84 96,077.76 96,512.65 























Table C1 - Falsification test of the diff-in-diff design (Germany) 
  
 Dependent variable: 
 Positive evaluation of  
post-Brexit UK (1-5) 
Support for EU  
exit (1-4) 
 July 2017 – 
Dec. 2017 
Dec. 2017 –  
July 2018 





No game 0.053 0.043 0.058 0.059 
 (0.091) (0.097) (0.084) (0.091) 
Wave (Dec. 2017) -0.063  -0.045  
 (0.058)  (0.053)  
Wave (July 2018)  0.183***  0.127** 
  (0.060)  (0.058) 
Constant 1.709*** 1.995*** 0.505** 1.078*** 
 (0.226) (0.240) (0.201) (0.235) 
Observations 2,749 2,738 2,797 2,764 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.037 0.048 0.042 
Region FE ü ü ü ü 
Dem. controls ü ü ü ü 









Table C2 - Diff-in-diff design (Germany): Placebo outcomes  
 Dependent variable: 
 Support government’s Brexit 
strategy  
Evaluation of Brexit effects on 
Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Higher exposure 0.099 0.049 0.065 0.056 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.081) (0.082) 
Wave (Dec. 2018) -0.011 0.0002 0.142*** 0.144*** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.052) (0.054) 
Constant 3.121*** 2.598*** 2.806*** 3.009*** 
 (0.191) (0.275) (0.111) (0.242) 
Observations 3,007 2,950 3,050 2,990 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.030 0.011 0.016 
Region FE ü ü ü ü 
Dem. controls  ü  ü 






Figure C1 - Mediation sensitivity analysis 
 
We choose as the sensitivity parameter the correlation ρ between the residuals of the 
mediator and outcome regressions. If there exist unobserved pre-treatment confounders 
which affect both the mediator and the outcome, we expect that the sequential 
ignorability assumption is vioated and ρ is no longer zero. The sensitivity analysis is 
conducted by varying the value of ρ and examining how the estimated ACME changes. 
The results show that for the point estimate of the ACME to be 0 the correlation between 
the residuals of the mediator and outcome regressions must be approximately 0.5. 
 
